UDP traffic
Datagrams matching asn:10439 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
132
Datagrams
34
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
40
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
54 datagrams from 24 sourcesRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest NTP datagram, to 123/udp
payload bytes
00000000 e3 00 04 fa 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c5 4f 23 4b 71 b1 52 f3 |.........O#Kq.R.|
Other services
14 datagrams from 9 sourcesFirst packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.
Latest GTP-C datagram, to 2123/udp
payload bytes
00000000 32 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 0c 3d 00 00 |2........=..|
QUIC
6 datagrams from 5 sourcesInitial packets of HTTP/3 connections, decoded on the sensor.
Latest QUIC datagram, to 443/udp
Unrecognised
55 datagrams from 17 sourcesDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5006/udp
payload bytes
00000000 57 00 00 00 00 11 11 07 00 00 ff ff 03 00 00 fe |W...............| 00000010 03 00 00 14 00 1c 08 0a 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000020 04 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 01 |.........|
Peer-to-peer
3 datagrams from 3 sourcesFile-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NTP | 123/udp | 20 | 12 | 556.9 |
| DNS | 53/udp +1 | 6 | 5 | 28 to 54 |
| WS-Discovery | 3702/udp | 5 | 5 | 10 to 500 |
| SNMPv2 | 161/udp | 9 | 4 | 6.3 |
| NetBIOS | 137/udp | 6 | 4 | 3.8 |
| Portmap | 111/udp | 4 | 4 | 7 to 28 |
| CLDAP | 389/udp | 2 | 2 | 56 to 70 |
| mDNS | 5353/udp | 1 | 1 | 2 to 10 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
DNS questions
DNS record types
QUIC versions
Networks
- AS10439 CariNet, Inc. from 34 sources132
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 71.6.199.23 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 14 | 2026-10-10 13:41 |
| 71.6.233.2 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | NTP | 13 | 2026-10-06 15:50 |
| 71.6.135.131 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 12 | 2026-10-10 20:18 |
| 71.6.134.232 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 9 | 2026-10-08 20:30 |
| 71.6.134.231 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 8 | 2026-10-10 14:59 |
| 71.6.134.234 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 7 | 2026-10-10 18:55 |
| 71.6.134.228 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | GTP-C | 7 | 2026-10-11 03:26 |
| 66.240.236.119 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 6 | 2026-10-11 01:20 |
| 66.240.192.138 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 5 | 2026-10-10 11:51 |
| 71.6.134.237 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | BitTorrent | 5 | 2026-10-08 22:57 |
| 71.6.232.30 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | SNMP | 4 | 2026-10-06 03:24 |
| 71.6.134.230 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 4 | 2026-10-09 19:42 |
| 71.6.232.20 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | NetBIOS | 4 | 2026-10-07 09:01 |
| 71.6.134.236 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 4 | 2026-10-08 03:30 |
| 71.6.134.235 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 3 | 2026-10-09 13:42 |
| 71.6.232.24 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | NTP | 3 | 2026-10-07 17:13 |
| 66.240.223.214 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | NTP | 2 | 2026-10-06 05:30 |
| 71.6.165.200 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 2 | 2026-10-10 15:23 |
| 71.6.232.27 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | DNS | 2 | 2026-10-05 16:49 |
| 71.6.142.213 | AS10439 CariNet, Inc. | US | NTP | 2 | 2026-10-06 06:29 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 64 31 3a 61 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 71 88 80 c8 |d1:ad2:id20:q...| 00000010 76 72 f1 13 d3 a2 a4 f6 64 45 c7 50 46 0c 33 46 |vr......dE.PF.3F| 00000020 36 3a 74 61 72 67 65 74 32 30 3a be f6 01 d2 c0 |6:target20:.....| 00000030 f9 b2 5c 82 05 5b 4f c6 68 e3 53 94 d2 d0 b7 65 |..\..[O.h.S....e| 00000040 31 3a 71 39 3a 66 69 6e 64 5f 6e 6f 64 65 31 3a |1:q9:find_node1:| 00000050 74 31 3a 61 31 3a 79 31 3a 71 65 |t1:a1:y1:qe|
payload bytes
00000000 57 00 00 00 00 11 11 07 00 00 ff ff 03 00 00 fe |W...............| 00000010 03 00 00 14 00 1c 08 0a 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000020 04 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 01 |.........|
payload bytes
00000000 e3 00 04 fa 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c5 4f 23 4b 71 b1 52 f3 |.........O#Kq.R.|
payload bytes
00000000 31 27 fc b0 38 10 9e 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |1'..8...........| 00000010 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 5c |...............\| 00000020 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 50 01 01 00 02 |...........P....| 00000030 03 00 00 24 01 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 |...$............| 00000040 80 04 00 02 80 03 00 03 80 0b 00 01 00 0c 00 04 |................| 00000050 00 00 0e 10 00 00 00 24 02 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 |.......$........| 00000060 80 02 00 01 80 04 00 02 80 03 00 03 80 0b 00 01 |................| 00000070 00 0c 00 04 00 00 0e 10 0d 00 00 18 1e 2b 51 69 |.............+Qi| 00000080 05 99 1c 7d 7c 96 fc bf b5 87 e4 61 00 00 00 04 |...}|......a....| 00000090 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f |....@H..n...%...| 000000a0 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e |............>.in| 000000b0 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 26 24 4d 38 |.c...B{.....&$M8| 000000c0 ed db 61 b3 17 2a 36 e3 d0 cf b8 19 |..a..*6.....|payload bytes
00000000 3c 3f 78 6d 6c 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 22 31 |<?xml version="1| 00000010 2e 30 22 20 65 6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67 3d 22 75 74 |.0" encoding="ut| 00000020 66 2d 38 22 3f 3e 0a 3c 73 6f 61 70 3a 45 6e 76 |f-8"?>.<soap:Env| 00000030 65 6c 6f 70 65 20 78 6d 6c 6e 73 3a 73 6f 61 70 |elope xmlns:soap| 00000040 3d 22 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 77 77 77 2e 77 33 2e |="http://www.w3.| 00000050 6f 72 67 2f 32 30 30 33 2f 30 35 2f 73 6f 61 70 |org/2003/05/soap| 00000060 2d 65 6e 76 65 6c 6f 70 65 22 20 78 6d 6c 6e 73 |-envelope" xmlns| 00000070 3a 77 73 61 3d 22 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 73 63 68 |:wsa="http://sch| 00000080 65 6d 61 73 2e 78 6d 6c 73 6f 61 70 2e 6f 72 67 |emas.xmlsoap.org| 00000090 2f 77 73 2f 32 30 30 34 2f 30 38 2f 61 64 64 72 |/ws/2004/08/addr| 000000a0 65 73 73 69 6e 67 22 20 78 6d 6c 6e 73 3a 77 73 |essing" xmlns:ws| 000000b0 64 3d 22 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 73 63 68 65 6d 61 |d="http://schema| 000000c0 73 2e 78 6d 6c 73 6f 61 70 2e 6f 72 67 2f 77 73 |s.xmlsoap.org/ws| 000000d0 2f 32 30 30 35 2f 30 34 2f 64 69 73 63 6f 76 65 |/2005/04/discove| 000000e0 72 79 22 20 78 6d 6c 6e 73 3a 77 73 64 70 3d 22 |ry" xmlns:wsdp="| 000000f0 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 73 63 68 65 6d 61 73 2e 78 |http://schemas.x| ... 512 bytes shown in part
payload bytes
00000000 30 84 00 00 00 2d 02 01 07 63 84 00 00 00 24 04 |0....-...c....$.| 00000010 00 0a 01 00 0a 01 00 02 01 00 02 01 64 01 01 00 |............d...| 00000020 87 0b 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 43 6c 61 73 73 30 84 00 |..objectClass0..| 00000030 00 00 00 |...|
payload bytes
00000000 53 4e 51 55 45 52 59 3a 20 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 |SNQUERY: 127.0.0| 00000010 2e 31 3a 41 41 41 41 41 41 3a 78 73 76 72 |.1:AAAAAA:xsvr|
payload bytes
00000000 ae 0d 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |.google.com.....|
payload bytes
00000000 30 26 02 01 01 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a1 19 02 |0&.....public...| 00000010 04 dc 63 c2 9a 02 01 00 02 01 00 30 0b 30 09 06 |..c........0.0..| 00000020 05 2b 06 01 02 01 05 00 |.+......|
payload bytes
00000000 02 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 46 3c b5 d3 |............F<..|
payload bytes
00000000 30 3a 02 01 03 30 0f 02 02 4a 69 02 03 00 ff e3 |0:...0...Ji.....| 00000010 04 01 04 02 01 03 04 10 30 0e 04 00 02 01 00 02 |........0.......| 00000020 01 00 04 00 04 00 04 00 30 12 04 00 04 00 a0 0c |........0.......| 00000030 02 02 37 f0 02 01 00 02 01 00 30 00 |..7.......0.|
payload bytes
00000000 38 d9 ce 3a be f6 98 a5 6d 00 00 00 00 00 54 |8..:....m.....T|
payload bytes
00000000 b8 14 35 fe 28 94 8d ab c9 c0 d1 99 85 95 6f 3f |..5.(.........o?|
payload bytes
00000000 53 4e 51 55 45 52 59 3a 20 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 |SNQUERY: 127.0.0| 00000010 2e 31 3a 41 41 41 41 41 41 3a 78 73 76 72 |.1:AAAAAA:xsvr|
payload bytes
00000000 00 00 04 17 27 10 19 80 00 00 00 00 00 03 49 25 |....'.........I%|