HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:HU sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

77

Datagrams

3

Source addresses

3

Networks

1

Countries

3

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

3 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query TXT/CH VERSION.BIND

payload bytes
00000000  34 ef 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 07 56 45 52  |4............VER|
00000010  53 49 4f 4e 04 42 49 4e  44 00 00 10 00 03        |SION.BIND.....|

Other services

2 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SIP datagram, to 5060/udp

OPTIONS sip:carol@chicago.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hGOPTIONS sip:carol@chicago.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKhjhs8ass877 Max-Forwards: 70 To: <sip:carol@chicago.com> From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 Call-ID: a84b4c76

payload bytes
00000000  4f 50 54 49 4f 4e 53 20  73 69 70 3a 63 61 72 6f  |OPTIONS sip:caro|
00000010  6c 40 63 68 69 63 61 67  6f 2e 63 6f 6d 20 53 49  |l@chicago.com SI|
00000020  50 2f 32 2e 30 0d 0a 56  69 61 3a 20 53 49 50 2f  |P/2.0..Via: SIP/|
00000030  32 2e 30 2f 55 44 50 20  70 63 33 33 2e 61 74 6c  |2.0/UDP pc33.atl|
00000040  61 6e 74 61 2e 63 6f 6d  3b 62 72 61 6e 63 68 3d  |anta.com;branch=|
00000050  7a 39 68 47 4f 50 54 49  4f 4e 53 20 73 69 70 3a  |z9hGOPTIONS sip:|
00000060  63 61 72 6f 6c 40 63 68  69 63 61 67 6f 2e 63 6f  |carol@chicago.co|
00000070  6d 20 53 49 50 2f 32 2e  30 0d 0a 56 69 61 3a 20  |m SIP/2.0..Via: |
00000080  53 49 50 2f 32 2e 30 2f  55 44 50 20 70 63 33 33  |SIP/2.0/UDP pc33|
00000090  2e 61 74 6c 61 6e 74 61  2e 63 6f 6d 3b 62 72 61  |.atlanta.com;bra|
000000a0  6e 63 68 3d 7a 39 68 47  34 62 4b 68 6a 68 73 38  |nch=z9hG4bKhjhs8|
000000b0  61 73 73 38 37 37 0d 0a  4d 61 78 2d 46 6f 72 77  |ass877..Max-Forw|
000000c0  61 72 64 73 3a 20 37 30  0d 0a 54 6f 3a 20 3c 73  |ards: 70..To: <s|
000000d0  69 70 3a 63 61 72 6f 6c  40 63 68 69 63 61 67 6f  |ip:carol@chicago|
000000e0  2e 63 6f 6d 3e 0d 0a 46  72 6f 6d 3a 20 41 6c 69  |.com>..From: Ali|
000000f0  63 65 20 3c 73 69 70 3a  61 6c 69 63 65 40 61 74  |ce <sip:alice@at|

Peer-to-peer

72 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp3128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
79.172.247.168AS47159 Celldomolki Kabeltelevizio Kft.HUBitTorrent722026-10-12 19:40
45.9.168.192AS211619 MAXKO d.o.o.HUDNS32026-10-12 06:35
37.221.209.87AS41075 ATW Internet Kft.HUSIP22026-10-11 20:37

Latest datagrams