HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:AE sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

49

Datagrams

4

Source addresses

3

Networks

1

Countries

10

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

35 datagrams from 2 sources

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0$·public·6·d0 0·+·

payload bytes
00000000  30 24 02 01 01 04 06 70  75 62 6c 69 63 a5 17 02  |0$.....public...|
00000010  04 f2 36 fc 9f 02 01 00  02 01 64 30 09 30 07 06  |..6.......d0.0..|
00000020  03 2b 06 01 05 00                                 |.+....|

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SOCKS5 datagram, to 25039/udp

·4Vx ·

payload bytes
00000000  05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  |..............4V|
00000010  78 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |x...............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|

Unrecognised

13 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 3702/udp

<tds:GetDeviceInformation />

payload bytes
00000000  3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74  44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e  |<tds:GetDeviceIn|
00000010  66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f  6e 20 2f 3e              |formation />|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp1216.3
CLDAP389/udp8156 to 70
SSDP1900/udp8130.8
NTP123/udp41556.9
WS-Discovery3702/udp4110 to 500
Portmap111/udp217 to 28
NetBIOS137/udp113.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
151.243.11.230AS209630 LLC Vash Kredit BankAESNMP462026-10-11 08:55
217.60.76.59AS401626 Netiface America, Inc.AEUnrecognised12026-10-10 13:52
92.96.208.139AS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Group CompanAESOCKS512026-10-10 15:28
217.60.76.179AS401626 Netiface America, Inc.AENetBIOS12026-10-10 15:54

Latest datagrams