UDP traffic
Datagrams matching country:AE sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
49
Datagrams
4
Source addresses
3
Networks
1
Countries
10
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
35 datagrams from 2 sourcesRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp
payload bytes
00000000 30 24 02 01 01 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a5 17 02 |0$.....public...| 00000010 04 f2 36 fc 9f 02 01 00 02 01 64 30 09 30 07 06 |..6.......d0.0..| 00000020 03 2b 06 01 05 00 |.+....|
Other services
1 datagrams from 1 sourceFirst packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.
Latest SOCKS5 datagram, to 25039/udp
payload bytes
00000000 05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56 |..............4V| 00000010 78 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |x...............| 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 00000090 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| 000000f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
Unrecognised
13 datagrams from 2 sourcesDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 3702/udp
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74 44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e |<tds:GetDeviceIn| 00000010 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 2f 3e |formation />|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SNMPv2 | 161/udp | 12 | 1 | 6.3 |
| CLDAP | 389/udp | 8 | 1 | 56 to 70 |
| SSDP | 1900/udp | 8 | 1 | 30.8 |
| NTP | 123/udp | 4 | 1 | 556.9 |
| WS-Discovery | 3702/udp | 4 | 1 | 10 to 500 |
| Portmap | 111/udp | 2 | 1 | 7 to 28 |
| NetBIOS | 137/udp | 1 | 1 | 3.8 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
Networks
- AS209630 LLC Vash Kredit Bank from 1 source46
- AS401626 Netiface America, Inc. from 2 sources2
- AS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Group Compan from 1 source1
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151.243.11.230 | AS209630 LLC Vash Kredit Bank | AE | SNMP | 46 | 2026-10-11 08:55 |
| 217.60.76.59 | AS401626 Netiface America, Inc. | AE | Unrecognised | 1 | 2026-10-10 13:52 |
| 92.96.208.139 | AS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Group Compan | AE | SOCKS5 | 1 | 2026-10-10 15:28 |
| 217.60.76.179 | AS401626 Netiface America, Inc. | AE | NetBIOS | 1 | 2026-10-10 15:54 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 01 01 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.....well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 01 01 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.....well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 01 01 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.....well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 01 01 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.....well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74 44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e |<tds:GetDeviceIn| 00000010 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 2f 3e |formation />|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74 44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e |<tds:GetDeviceIn| 00000010 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 2f 3e |formation />|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74 44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e |<tds:GetDeviceIn| 00000010 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 2f 3e |formation />|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 64 73 3a 47 65 74 44 65 76 69 63 65 49 6e |<tds:GetDeviceIn| 00000010 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 2f 3e |formation />|
payload bytes
00000000 30 24 02 01 01 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a5 17 02 |0$.....public...| 00000010 04 f2 36 fc 9f 02 01 00 02 01 64 30 09 30 07 06 |..6.......d0.0..| 00000020 03 2b 06 01 05 00 |.+....|
payload bytes
00000000 30 24 02 01 01 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a5 17 02 |0$.....public...| 00000010 04 f2 36 fc 9f 02 01 00 02 01 64 30 09 30 07 06 |..6.......d0.0..| 00000020 03 2b 06 01 05 00 |.+....|
payload bytes
00000000 30 24 02 01 01 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a5 17 02 |0$.....public...| 00000010 04 f2 36 fc 9f 02 01 00 02 01 64 30 09 30 07 06 |..6.......d0.0..| 00000020 03 2b 06 01 05 00 |.+....|