HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:5719 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

3

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

3 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A research-optout.ubcnet.ca

payload bytes
00000000  fe 3e 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 01 0f 72 65 73  |.>...........res|
00000010  65 61 72 63 68 2d 6f 70  74 6f 75 74 06 75 62 63  |earch-optout.ubc|
00000020  6e 65 74 02 63 61 00 00  01 00 01 00 00 29 04 d0  |net.ca.......)..|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00                                 |......|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp3128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
130.245.42.162AS5719 State University of New York at Stony BrUSDNS32026-10-06 02:03

Latest datagrams