HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:50219 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

55

Datagrams

11

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

18

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

20 datagrams from 9 sources

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A www.google.com

payload bytes
00000000  ae 0d 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77  |.............www|
00000010  06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03  63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01  |.google.com.....|

Other services

9 datagrams from 6 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest GTP-U datagram, to 2152/udp

2·=·

payload bytes
00000000  32 01 00 04 00 00 00 00  0c 3d 00 00              |2........=..|

QUIC

2 datagrams from 2 sources

Initial packets of HTTP/3 connections, decoded on the sensor.

Latest QUIC datagram, to 443/udp

QUIC version 0xfa1a1a1a probe

Unrecognised

22 datagrams from 8 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 1701/udp

·X·Vigor· · 陀 · ·Draytek

payload bytes
00000000  c8 02 00 58 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00  |...X............|
00000010  00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00  00 02 01 00 80 0b 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 07 56 69 67 6f 72 80  0a 00 00 00 03 00 00 00  |..Vigor.........|
00000030  03 80 08 00 00 00 09 e9  99 80 0a 00 00 00 04 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 03 00 08 00 00 00  06 00 01 00 0d 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  08 44 72 61 79 74 65 6b                           |.Draytek|

Peer-to-peer

2 datagrams from 2 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp1052 to 10
SNMPv2161/udp426.3
NetBIOS137/udp223.8
DNS53/udp1128 to 54
NTP123/udp11556.9
SSDP1900/udp1130.8
WS-Discovery3702/udp1110 to 500

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

QUIC versions

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
216.226.76.20AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised82026-10-10 22:25
216.226.78.10AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised82026-10-08 21:51
216.226.78.20AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USDNS72026-10-09 14:12
216.226.76.30AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised62026-10-10 14:15
194.164.107.5AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USSNMP52026-10-07 12:06
216.226.77.20AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised52026-10-09 00:28
216.226.77.30AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised42026-10-11 04:16
216.226.78.30AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USUnrecognised42026-10-09 09:41
216.226.76.10AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USQUIC42026-10-10 14:04
194.164.107.4AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USDNS32026-10-10 02:01
194.164.107.6AS50219 Valence Technology Co.USNetBIOS12026-10-08 13:46

Latest datagrams