HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:34984 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

14

Datagrams

2

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

6

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

13 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8083/udp

@.LnP·J·~·o·#Q_wM kJ;·{·CK]2·

payload bytes
00000000  40 2e 4c 6e 50 01 1d 4a  03 7e 0f 6f 06 23 51 5f  |@.LnP..J.~.o.#Q_|
00000010  77 4d 20 6b 4a 3b 04 7b  01 43 4b 5d 32 82        |wM kJ;.{.CK]2.|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
Memcached11211/udp6110,000 to 51,000

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
195.33.200.58AS34984 Superonline Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.TRUnrecognised132026-10-10 17:01
212.252.73.26AS34984 Superonline Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.TRUnrecognised12026-10-10 10:17

Latest datagrams