HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:329009 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

18

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

10

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

17 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8083/udp

?.>·cj(*@·;-5·|:5·U·opTn·t<J·{i]·MG3w·424iM;·

payload bytes
00000000  3f 2e 3e 10 63 6a 28 2a  40 00 3b 2d 35 1a 06 7c  |?.>.cj(*@.;-5..||
00000010  3a 35 11 55 01 07 6f 70  54 6e 1d 74 3c 4a 1e 7b  |:5.U..opTn.t<J.{|
00000020  69 5d 0b 4d 47 33 77 07  34 32 34 69 4d 3b a8 1a  |i].MG3w.424iM;..|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SSDP1900/udp3130.8
mDNS5353/udp212 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
102.216.212.122AS329009 Spectrum Internet Service LtdGHUnrecognised182026-10-11 07:25

Latest datagrams