HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:329009 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

17

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

10

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

16 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5353/udp

".·(d*F·v·S·=*\G·Oaj_JS Gd&h·=·t@·$=c93c ?!7·hNkI8J·U[o{C·8Ny·

payload bytes
00000000  22 2e 03 08 28 64 2a 46  15 76 00 53 0c 3d 2a 5c  |"...(d*F.v.S.=*\|
00000010  47 17 4f 61 6a 5f 4a 53  0a 47 64 26 68 15 3d 0b  |G.Oaj_JS.Gd&h.=.|
00000020  74 40 13 1c 24 3d 63 39  33 63 0d 3f 21 37 1b 68  |t@..$=c93c.?!7.h|
00000030  4e 6b 49 38 4a 13 0b 55  5b 6f 7b 43 04 38 4e 79  |NkI8J..U[o{C.8Ny|
00000040  be 83                                             |..|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SSDP1900/udp3130.8
mDNS5353/udp212 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
102.216.212.122AS329009 Spectrum Internet Service LtdGHUnrecognised172026-10-09 13:01

Latest datagrams