HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:21859 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

165

Datagrams

16

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

39

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

56 datagrams from 16 sources

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0:·0·Ji·0·0·7·0·

payload bytes
00000000  30 3a 02 01 03 30 0f 02  02 4a 69 02 03 00 ff e3  |0:...0...Ji.....|
00000010  04 01 04 02 01 03 04 10  30 0e 04 00 02 01 00 02  |........0.......|
00000020  01 00 04 00 04 00 04 00  30 12 04 00 04 00 a0 0c  |........0.......|
00000030  02 02 37 f0 02 01 00 02  01 00 30 00              |..7.......0.|

Other services

17 datagrams from 10 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest GTP-C datagram, to 2123/udp

@· ·

payload bytes
00000000  40 01 00 09 00 ab cd 00  03 00 01 00 00           |@............|

Unrecognised

89 datagrams from 13 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 47808/udp

· ·!·?· · · , : F K M y·

payload bytes
00000000  81 0a 00 21 01 04 02 05  01 0e 0c 02 3f ff ff 1e  |...!........?...|
00000010  09 0c 09 1c 09 2c 09 3a  09 46 09 4b 09 4d 09 79  |.....,.:.F.K.M.y|
00000020  1f                                                |.|

Peer-to-peer

3 datagrams from 3 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp3196.3
TFTP69/udp +19760
RIPv1520/udp65131.24
Portmap111/udp337 to 28
mDNS5353/udp332 to 10
CLDAP389/udp3356 to 70
CharGEN19/udp33358.8
SSDP1900/udp3330.8
Memcached11211/udp3310,000 to 51,000
WS-Discovery3702/udp3310 to 500
NTP123/udp22556.9
NetBIOS137/udp223.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
109.105.210.62AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised202026-10-09 08:20
185.180.141.9AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised172026-10-09 08:20
185.180.141.10AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised152026-10-09 08:19
185.226.197.30AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised152026-10-10 02:48
185.180.141.7AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised132026-10-09 08:19
185.226.197.28AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised132026-10-10 02:48
109.105.210.65AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised122026-10-09 08:21
185.226.197.27AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised122026-10-10 02:49
109.105.210.64AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised112026-10-09 08:21
185.226.197.29AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised82026-10-10 02:49
109.105.210.63AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised72026-10-09 08:21
185.226.196.29AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTSNMP62026-10-06 07:50
185.226.196.27AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised52026-10-06 07:50
185.180.141.8AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTUnrecognised52026-10-09 08:19
185.226.196.30AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTSNMP32026-10-06 07:51
185.226.196.28AS21859 Zenlayer IncPTSNMP32026-10-06 07:49

Latest datagrams