HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:216014 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

75

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

8

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

71 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest Sun RPC datagram, to 111/udp

·

payload bytes
00000000  1a a9 ff e1 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 02 00 01 86 a0  |................|
00000010  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                           |........|

Unrecognised

4 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 520/udp

·

payload bytes
00000000  01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00                           |........|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
Portmap111/udp3017 to 28
mDNS5353/udp2612 to 10
SNMPv2161/udp416.3
SSDP1900/udp4130.8
TFTP69/udp3160
RIPv1520/udp21131.24

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
193.47.62.187AS216014 BestDC LimitedBGTFTP752026-10-10 22:38

Latest datagrams