HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:150968 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

9

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

5

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

9 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 11211/udp

D.{mMGr·k_6z ·8,m·RB

payload bytes
00000000  44 2e 7b 6d 4d 47 72 1e  1c 6b 5f 36 7a 0d 0e 38  |D.{mMGr..k_6z..8|
00000010  2c 6d 19 06 52 42 20                              |,m..RB |

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
Memcached11211/udp4110,000 to 51,000
SSDP1900/udp2130.8
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
103.123.175.6AS150968 PT Jaringanku Media TelekomunikasiIDUnrecognised92026-10-10 22:57

Latest datagrams