HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching qname:"rr-mirror.research.nawrocki.berlin" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

4 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A rr-mirror.research.nawrocki.berlin

payload bytes
00000000  cd 4b 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 09 72 72 2d  |.K...........rr-|
00000010  6d 69 72 72 6f 72 08 72  65 73 65 61 72 63 68 08  |mirror.research.|
00000020  6e 61 77 72 6f 63 6b 69  06 62 65 72 6c 69 6e 00  |nawrocki.berlin.|
00000030  00 01 00 01                                       |....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp4128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
141.22.28.227AS680 Verein zur Foerderung eines Deutschen FoDEDNS42026-10-10 02:45

Latest datagrams