HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching qname:"r-acddc5f6.777503.xyz" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

4 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query NS r-acddc5f6.777503.xyz

payload bytes
00000000  04 d2 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 01 0a 72 2d 61  |.............r-a|
00000010  63 64 64 63 35 66 36 06  37 37 37 35 30 33 03 78  |cddc5f6.777503.x|
00000020  79 7a 00 00 02 00 01 00  00 29 10 00 00 00 00 00  |yz.......)......|
00000030  00 00                                             |..|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp4128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
45.205.1.164AS215925 Vpsvault.host LtdBRDNS42026-10-06 22:16

Latest datagrams