HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching qname:"inanis.asertdnsresearch.com" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

10

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

10 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A inanis.asertdnsresearch.com

payload bytes
00000000  80 0a 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 06 69 6e 61  |.............ina|
00000010  6e 69 73 10 61 73 65 72  74 64 6e 73 72 65 73 65  |nis.asertdnsrese|
00000020  61 72 63 68 03 63 6f 6d  00 00 01 00 01           |arch.com.....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp10128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
139.162.66.65AS63949 Akamai Connected CloudJPDNS102026-10-10 18:01

Latest datagrams