UDP traffic
Datagrams matching port:39808 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans
1
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
1 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 39808/udp
payload bytes
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 5f 73 65 |............._se| 00000010 72 76 69 63 65 73 07 5f 64 6e 73 2d 73 64 04 5f |rvices._dns-sd._| 00000020 75 64 70 05 6c 6f 63 61 6c 00 00 0c 00 01 |udp.local.....|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 39808/udp | 1 | 1 | 28 to 54 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
- 39808/udp DNS1
DNS questions
DNS record types
- PTR1
Networks
- AS398324 Censys, Inc. from 1 source1
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 66.132.172.244 | AS398324 Censys, Inc. | US | DNS | 1 | 2026-10-11 04:27 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 5f 73 65 |............._se| 00000010 72 76 69 63 65 73 07 5f 64 6e 73 2d 73 64 04 5f |rvices._dns-sd._| 00000020 75 64 70 05 6c 6f 63 61 6c 00 00 0c 00 01 |udp.local.....|