HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:ZA sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

7

Datagrams

5

Source addresses

5

Networks

1

Countries

6

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

2 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0)·public·8D·0·0·+·

payload bytes
00000000  30 29 02 01 00 04 06 70  75 62 6c 69 63 a0 1c 02  |0).....public...|
00000010  04 38 44 8d ea 02 01 00  02 01 00 30 0e 30 0c 06  |.8D........0.0..|
00000020  08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01  00 05 00                 |.+.........|

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SOCKS5 datagram, to 26944/udp

·4Vx·

payload bytes
00000000  05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  |..............4V|
00000010  78 06 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |x...............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|

Unrecognised

4 datagrams from 3 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 40650/udp

·O·ُ·4Vxg·-৖V

payload bytes
00000000  01 4f 8e d9 8f d4 7f a3  ae 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  |.O..............|
00000010  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  78 67 a6 15 2d e0 a7 96  |......4Vxg..-...|
00000020  56                                                |V|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp216.3

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
196.34.146.69AS3741 Dimension DataZASNMP22026-10-11 01:30
102.132.178.204AS37680 Cool Ideas Service Provider (Pty) LtdZAUnrecognised22026-10-10 22:24
105.185.158.222AS37457 Telkom SA Ltd.ZAUnrecognised12026-10-10 10:20
102.221.250.175AS328760 ZTEL PTY LTDZASOCKS512026-10-10 07:39
102.206.95.152AS329126 IIP1 Pty LtdZAUnrecognised12026-10-10 08:07

Latest datagrams