HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:KE sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

5

Datagrams

5

Source addresses

4

Networks

1

Countries

5

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

1 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest NetBIOS datagram, to 137/udp

NetBIOS node status query *

payload bytes
00000000  00 06 00 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 20 43 4b 41  |............ CKA|
00000010  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  |AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA|
00000020  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  41 41 41 41 41 00 00 21  |AAAAAAAAAAAAA..!|
00000030  00 01                                             |..|

Other services

2 datagrams from 2 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SOCKS5 datagram, to 42908/udp

·4Vx·

payload bytes
00000000  05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  |..............4V|
00000010  78 08 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |x...............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|

Unrecognised

2 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 12337/udp

·C·_X·4Vx·J!·

payload bytes
00000000  01 7f 43 a9 86 be a0 5f  58 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  |..C...._X.......|
00000010  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  78 95 1b bc d9 4a 21 0b  |......4Vx....J!.|
00000020  a6                                                |.|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
NetBIOS137/udp113.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
217.199.148.248AS9129 MTN SAKESOCKS512026-10-07 10:04
197.248.79.21AS37061 Safaricom LimitedKENetBIOS12026-10-10 09:39
197.157.228.158AS37129 RasmilinkKESOCKS512026-10-07 12:10
217.199.144.48AS9129 MTN SAKEUnrecognised12026-10-07 06:11
102.205.48.52AS329341 Tatu Telecom Company SEZ LimitedKEUnrecognised12026-10-07 08:18

Latest datagrams