HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:AU sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

332

Datagrams

14

Source addresses

9

Networks

1

Countries

15

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

2 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query TXT/CH www.stage

payload bytes
00000000  be ef 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77  |.............www|
00000010  05 73 74 61 67 65 00 00  10 00 03                 |.stage.....|

Other services

81 datagrams from 5 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SIP datagram, to 5060/udp

INVITE sip:900061420163737@<HONEYPOT>:5060;transport=UDP SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 144.172.64.68:27632;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---c8183379f8e165bc;rport Max-Forwards: 70 From: <sip:19260344082@<HONEYPOT>>;tag=d1ca23be To: <sip:900061420163737@<HONEYPOT>:5060> Call-ID: T2kLwt0Di3nkT4AsRCgYvo.. CS

Payload bytes withheld: they contain the sensor's address.

Unrecognised

17 datagrams from 5 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8080/udp

3.P·4Q"·g0,w=gz·n·H%·T ·Qhpe·#64W·Vrn·eC·`FsbR<·W[·+9·

payload bytes
00000000  33 2e 50 18 34 51 22 1b  67 30 2c 77 3d 67 7a 03  |3.P.4Q".g0,w=gz.|
00000010  6e 02 0b 48 25 05 1f 14  54 0a 15 51 68 70 65 1b  |n..H%...T..Qhpe.|
00000020  23 36 34 57 07 56 72 6e  06 1e 65 43 05 60 46 73  |#64W.Vrn..eC.`Fs|
00000030  62 52 3c 07 57 5b 1b 2b  39 90                    |bR<.W[.+9.|

Peer-to-peer

232 datagrams from 5 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp2128 to 54
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10
SSDP1900/udp1130.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
101.185.179.82AS1221 Telstra LimitedAUBitTorrent1562026-10-10 07:10
203.123.113.224AS38195 SuperloopAUBitTorrent702026-10-06 22:53
51.161.136.177AS16276 OVH SASAUSIP572026-10-11 05:17
144.172.64.68AS14956 RouterHosting LLCAUSIP132026-10-11 08:02
144.172.64.83AS14956 RouterHosting LLCAUSIP82026-10-11 07:22
209.38.93.248AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLCAUUnrecognised82026-10-10 14:14
82.115.30.245AS60024 Hk Cedoc LimitedAUUnrecognised62026-10-10 09:20
49.178.186.54AS4804 Microplex PTY LTDAUBitTorrent32026-10-10 02:45
125.63.8.221AS38195 SuperloopAUUnrecognised22026-10-07 23:34
101.173.46.92AS1221 Telstra LimitedAUBitTorrent22026-10-10 13:26
1.42.113.191AS4804 Microplex PTY LTDAUSOCKS522026-10-06 19:33
144.130.164.158AS1221 Telstra LimitedAUUnrecognised22026-10-09 17:03
34.151.128.127AS396982 Google LLCAUDNS22026-10-06 07:59
150.228.243.233AS14593 Space Exploration Technologies CorporatiAUUnrecognised12026-10-10 06:05

Latest datagrams