UDP traffic
Datagrams matching asn:50219 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
9
Datagrams
4
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
6
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
3 datagrams from 2 sourcesRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp
payload bytes
00000000 ae 0d 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |.google.com.....|
Other services
1 datagrams from 1 sourceFirst packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.
Latest GTP-U datagram, to 2152/udp
payload bytes
00000000 32 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 0c 3d 00 00 |2........=..|
Unrecognised
4 datagrams from 3 sourcesDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 1701/udp
payload bytes
00000000 c8 02 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00 |...X............| 00000010 00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00 00 02 01 00 80 0b 00 00 |................| 00000020 00 07 56 69 67 6f 72 80 0a 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 |..Vigor.........| 00000030 03 80 08 00 00 00 09 e9 99 80 0a 00 00 00 04 00 |................| 00000040 00 00 03 00 08 00 00 00 06 00 01 00 0d 00 00 00 |................| 00000050 08 44 72 61 79 74 65 6b |.Draytek|
Peer-to-peer
1 datagrams from 1 sourceFile-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
DNS questions
DNS record types
Networks
- AS50219 Valence Technology Co. from 4 sources9
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 216.226.77.30 | AS50219 Valence Technology Co. | US | DNS | 3 | 2026-10-11 04:16 |
| 216.226.76.30 | AS50219 Valence Technology Co. | US | Unrecognised | 3 | 2026-10-10 14:15 |
| 216.226.76.10 | AS50219 Valence Technology Co. | US | BitTorrent | 2 | 2026-10-10 14:04 |
| 216.226.76.20 | AS50219 Valence Technology Co. | US | Unrecognised | 1 | 2026-10-10 22:25 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 c8 02 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00 |...X............| 00000010 00 00 00 01 80 08 00 00 00 02 01 00 80 0b 00 00 |................| 00000020 00 07 56 69 67 6f 72 80 0a 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 |..Vigor.........| 00000030 03 80 08 00 00 00 09 e9 99 80 0a 00 00 00 04 00 |................| 00000040 00 00 03 00 08 00 00 00 06 00 01 00 0d 00 00 00 |................| 00000050 08 44 72 61 79 74 65 6b |.Draytek|
payload bytes
00000000 a9 0d cd 73 34 08 24 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...s4.$U........| 00000010 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 00 00 01 34 |...........P...4| 00000020 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 28 01 01 00 08 |...........(....| 00000030 03 00 00 24 01 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 |...$............| 00000040 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 02 80 0b 00 01 00 0c 00 04 |................| 00000050 00 00 70 80 03 00 00 24 02 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 |..p....$........| 00000060 80 02 00 01 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 02 80 0b 00 01 |................| 00000070 00 0c 00 04 00 00 70 80 03 00 00 24 03 01 00 00 |......p....$....| 00000080 80 01 00 01 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 02 |................| 00000090 80 0b 00 01 00 0c 00 04 00 00 70 80 03 00 00 24 |..........p....$| 000000a0 04 01 00 00 80 01 00 01 80 02 00 01 80 03 00 01 |................| 000000b0 80 04 00 02 80 0b 00 01 00 0c 00 04 00 00 70 80 |..............p.| 000000c0 03 00 00 24 05 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 |...$............| 000000d0 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 01 80 0b 00 01 00 0c 00 04 |................| 000000e0 00 00 70 80 03 00 00 24 06 01 00 00 80 01 00 05 |..p....$........| 000000f0 80 02 00 01 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 01 80 0b 00 01 |................| ... 336 bytes shown in part
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 00 04 ff 00 00 00 |@.......|
payload bytes
00000000 ae 0d 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |.google.com.....|
payload bytes
00000000 32 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 0c 3d 00 00 |2........=..|
payload bytes
00000000 10 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff 33 31 33 33 |............3133| 00000010 00 00 00 00 |....|
payload bytes
00000000 62 b9 01 20 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 0c 5f 64 65 |b.. ........._de| 00000010 76 69 63 65 2d 69 6e 66 6f 04 5f 74 63 70 05 6c |vice-info._tcp.l| 00000020 6f 63 61 6c 00 00 0c 00 01 00 00 29 04 d0 00 00 |ocal.......)....| 00000030 00 00 00 0c 00 0a 00 08 83 4c 64 dd ca ac 8f 65 |.........Ld....e|
payload bytes
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 5f 73 65 |............._se| 00000010 72 76 69 63 65 73 07 5f 64 6e 73 2d 73 64 04 5f |rvices._dns-sd._| 00000020 75 64 70 05 6c 6f 63 61 6c 00 00 0c 00 01 |udp.local.....|
payload bytes
00000000 64 31 3a 61 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 71 88 80 c8 |d1:ad2:id20:q...| 00000010 76 72 f1 13 d3 a2 a4 f6 64 45 c7 50 46 0c 33 46 |vr......dE.PF.3F| 00000020 36 3a 74 61 72 67 65 74 32 30 3a be f6 01 d2 c0 |6:target20:.....| 00000030 f9 b2 5c 82 05 5b 4f c6 68 e3 53 94 d2 d0 b7 65 |..\..[O.h.S....e| 00000040 31 3a 71 39 3a 66 69 6e 64 5f 6e 6f 64 65 31 3a |1:q9:find_node1:| 00000050 74 31 3a 61 31 3a 79 31 3a 71 65 |t1:a1:y1:qe|