HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:46844 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

12

Datagrams

9

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

2

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

4 datagrams from 4 sources

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0:·0·Ji·0·0·7·0·

payload bytes
00000000  30 3a 02 01 03 30 0f 02  02 4a 69 02 03 00 ff e3  |0:...0...Ji.....|
00000010  04 01 04 02 01 03 04 10  30 0e 04 00 02 01 00 02  |........0.......|
00000020  01 00 04 00 04 00 04 00  30 12 04 00 04 00 a0 0c  |........0.......|
00000030  02 02 37 f0 02 01 00 02  01 00 30 00              |..7.......0.|

Unrecognised

8 datagrams from 7 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 161/udp

0·public·0·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +·0· +· ·0· +· ·0· +·0· +·0· +· ·0· +·0· +·0· +·

payload bytes
00000000  30 82 02 9d 02 01 01 04  06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a0  |0........public.|
00000010  82 02 8e 02 02 04 d2 02  01 00 02 01 00 30 82 02  |.............0..|
00000020  80 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 01 05  |.0...+..........|
00000030  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 02 05  |.0...+..........|
00000040  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 03 05  |.0...+..........|
00000050  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 04 05  |.0...+..........|
00000060  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 05 05  |.0...+..........|
00000070  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 06 05  |.0...+..........|
00000080  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 07 05  |.0...+..........|
00000090  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 08 05  |.0...+..........|
000000a0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 09 05  |.0...+..........|
000000b0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 0a 05  |.0...+..........|
000000c0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 0b 05  |.0...+..........|
000000d0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 0c 05  |.0...+..........|
000000e0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 0d 05  |.0...+..........|
000000f0  00 30 0e 06 0a 2b 06 01  02 01 02 02 01 02 0e 05  |.0...+..........|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp876.3

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
70.39.95.67AS46844 SharktechUSSNMP22026-10-10 07:21
45.58.168.180AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised22026-10-11 08:06
204.188.254.231AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised22026-10-11 08:10
70.39.95.129AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised12026-10-08 04:31
208.98.38.234AS46844 SharktechUSSNMP12026-10-10 07:09
70.39.95.20AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised12026-10-11 09:20
70.39.95.36AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised12026-10-11 08:43
204.188.254.145AS46844 SharktechUSUnrecognised12026-10-08 13:06
204.188.219.9AS46844 SharktechUSSNMP12026-10-10 07:22

Latest datagrams