UDP traffic
Datagrams matching asn:3741 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
2
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
2 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp
payload bytes
00000000 30 29 02 01 00 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a0 1c 02 |0).....public...| 00000010 04 38 44 8d ea 02 01 00 02 01 00 30 0e 30 0c 06 |.8D........0.0..| 00000020 08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01 00 05 00 |.+.........|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SNMPv2 | 161/udp | 2 | 1 | 6.3 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 196.34.146.69 | AS3741 Dimension Data | ZA | SNMP | 2 | 2026-10-11 01:30 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 30 29 02 01 00 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a0 1c 02 |0).....public...| 00000010 04 38 44 8d ea 02 01 00 02 01 00 30 0e 30 0c 06 |.8D........0.0..| 00000020 08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01 00 05 00 |.+.........|
payload bytes
00000000 30 29 02 01 00 04 06 70 75 62 6c 69 63 a0 1c 02 |0).....public...| 00000010 04 38 40 04 fa 02 01 00 02 01 00 30 0e 30 0c 06 |.8@........0.0..| 00000020 08 2b 06 01 02 01 01 01 00 05 00 |.+.........|