HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:34267 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

11

Datagrams

4

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

8

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

9 datagrams from 4 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5060/udp

v.Vzw·pydY3)c$^?{·{·*

payload bytes
00000000  76 2e 56 7a 77 0e 70 79  64 59 33 29 63 24 5e 3f  |v.Vzw.pydY3)c$^?|
00000010  7b 0f 7b 92 2a                                    |{.{.*|

Peer-to-peer

2 datagrams from 2 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp222 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
213.155.195.206AS34267 RostelecomRUUnrecognised52026-10-10 19:36
84.42.46.199AS34267 RostelecomRUUnrecognised32026-10-09 03:48
84.42.46.192AS34267 RostelecomRUUnrecognised22026-10-09 15:11
84.42.45.253AS34267 RostelecomRUUnrecognised12026-10-06 21:25

Latest datagrams