HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:29484 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

62

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

3

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

42 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest CoAP datagram, to 5683/udp

@·}p·.well-known·core

payload bytes
00000000  40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65  6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e  |@.}p..well-known|
00000010  04 63 6f 72 65                                    |.core|

Unrecognised

20 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5684/udp

@·}p·.well-known·core

payload bytes
00000000  40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65  6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e  |@.}p..well-known|
00000010  04 63 6f 72 65                                    |.core|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp20128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
185.73.23.133AS29484 Ruhr-Universitaet BochumDEDNS622026-10-11 05:05

Latest datagrams