HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:28209 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

8

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

7

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest OOKLA datagram, to 8080/udp

~.76·kB)x·h·7·nS_7fk+,g;G}D·{·:2 KQu zm*·U1Ej ·IW~4·*·=r·

payload bytes
00000000  7e 2e 37 36 01 11 1f 6b  42 29 78 1d 14 68 07 37  |~.76...kB)x..h.7|
00000010  15 6e 53 5f 37 66 6b 2b  2c 67 3b 47 7d 44 02 7b  |.nS_7fk+,g;G}D.{|
00000020  08 3a 32 09 4b 51 75 0d  7a 6d 2a 0e 55 31 45 6a  |.:2.KQu.zm*.U1Ej|
00000030  20 18 49 57 7e 34 02 2a  1b 3d 72 18 cd c1        | .IW~4.*.=r...|

Unrecognised

7 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 6881/udp

p.+·:·5

payload bytes
00000000  70 2e 2b 19 3a 13 8c 35                           |p.+.:..5|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
189.113.8.254AS28209 Under Servicos de Internet LtdaBRUnrecognised82026-10-11 08:03

Latest datagrams