HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:269832 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

64

Datagrams

3

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

5

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

33 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0:·0·Ji·0·0·7·0·

payload bytes
00000000  30 3a 02 01 03 30 0f 02  02 4a 69 02 03 00 ff e3  |0:...0...Ji.....|
00000010  04 01 04 02 01 03 04 10  30 0e 04 00 02 01 00 02  |........0.......|
00000020  01 00 04 00 04 00 04 00  30 12 04 00 04 00 a0 0c  |........0.......|
00000030  02 02 37 f0 02 01 00 02  01 00 30 00              |..7.......0.|

Unrecognised

8 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 38446/udp

CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

payload bytes
00000000  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000010  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000020  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000030  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000040  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000050  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000060  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000070  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000080  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
00000090  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000a0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000b0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000c0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000d0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000e0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|
000000f0  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43  |CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC|

Peer-to-peer

23 datagrams from 2 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp3216.3
NetBIOS137/udp113.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
38.41.27.154AS269832 MDS TELECOM C.A.VESNMP412026-10-07 04:02
38.41.12.132AS269832 MDS TELECOM C.A.VEBitTorrent212026-10-08 17:48
38.41.1.61AS269832 MDS TELECOM C.A.VEBitTorrent22026-10-09 19:48

Latest datagrams