UDP traffic
Datagrams matching asn:218970 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans
11
Datagrams
2
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
3
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
8 datagrams from 2 sourcesRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest NTP datagram, to 123/udp
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
Unrecognised
3 datagrams from 1 sourceDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 3702/udp
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 72 74 3a 47 65 74 50 72 6f 66 69 6c 65 73 |<trt:GetProfiles| 00000010 20 2f 3e 00 | />.|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 53/udp | 4 | 2 | 28 to 54 |
| NTP | 123/udp | 4 | 1 | 556.9 |
| WS-Discovery | 3702/udp | 3 | 1 | 10 to 500 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
DNS questions
DNS record types
- ANY4
Networks
- AS218970 Amin NezhadKahnoji from 2 sources11
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 217.60.242.50 | AS218970 Amin NezhadKahnoji | AE | NTP | 7 | 2026-10-10 00:01 |
| 217.60.242.56 | AS218970 Amin NezhadKahnoji | AE | Unrecognised | 4 | 2026-10-08 23:12 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 00 03 2a 00 00 00 00 |...*....|
payload bytes
00000000 fd ac 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 67 73 75 |.............gsu| 00000010 03 65 64 75 00 00 ff 00 01 00 00 29 10 00 00 00 |.edu.......)....| 00000020 80 00 00 00 |....|
payload bytes
00000000 fd ac 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 67 73 75 |.............gsu| 00000010 03 65 64 75 00 00 ff 00 01 00 00 29 10 00 00 00 |.edu.......)....| 00000020 80 00 00 00 |....|
payload bytes
00000000 fd ac 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 67 73 75 |.............gsu| 00000010 03 65 64 75 00 00 ff 00 01 00 00 29 10 00 00 00 |.edu.......)....| 00000020 80 00 00 00 |....|
payload bytes
00000000 45 67 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 ff 00 |Eg..............| 00000010 01 00 29 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |..).........|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 72 74 3a 47 65 74 50 72 6f 66 69 6c 65 73 |<trt:GetProfiles| 00000010 20 2f 3e 00 | />.|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 72 74 3a 47 65 74 50 72 6f 66 69 6c 65 73 |<trt:GetProfiles| 00000010 20 2f 3e 00 | />.|
payload bytes
00000000 3c 74 72 74 3a 47 65 74 50 72 6f 66 69 6c 65 73 |<trt:GetProfiles| 00000010 20 2f 3e 00 | />.|