HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:213877 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

10

Datagrams

2

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

6

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

10 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8080/udp

F.5e<44e·}·Y%&h ·b·e ·5

payload bytes
00000000  46 2e 35 65 3c 34 34 65  11 7d 04 59 25 26 68 0a  |F.5e<44e.}.Y%&h.|
00000010  1b 62 0f 01 18 65 0d cc  35                       |.b...e..5|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SSDP1900/udp2230.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
179.254.163.155AS213877 U1 Digital Services LtdDEUnrecognised72026-10-10 22:02
144.31.73.73AS213877 U1 Digital Services LtdDEUnrecognised32026-10-07 14:12

Latest datagrams