HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:210509 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

8

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

7

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

8 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 4000/udp

1.·veS·DX·O?·~6NBE·Ms3n·NJF·i<l<Q·URG.Q·mo·#=Vh=#[p·a|&·(

payload bytes
00000000  31 2e 1f 76 65 53 15 16  19 01 44 58 7f 4f 3f 1d  |1..veS....DX.O?.|
00000010  7e 36 4e 42 45 7f 4d 73  33 6e 06 0c 14 4e 4a 46  |~6NBE.Ms3n...NJF|
00000020  07 69 3c 6c 3c 51 02 55  52 47 2e 51 16 6d 6f 14  |.i<l<Q.URG.Q.mo.|
00000030  23 3d 56 68 3d 23 5b 70  11 61 7c 26 92 28        |#=Vh=#[p.a|&.(|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SSDP1900/udp1130.8
Memcached11211/udp1110,000 to 51,000

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
212.23.217.3AS210509 Optimum Line for Internet Services Ltd.AEUnrecognised82026-10-09 22:05

Latest datagrams