HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:19318 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

12

Datagrams

4

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

9

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Other services

3 datagrams from 2 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest SIP datagram, to 5060/udp

OPTIONS sip:100@<HONEYPOT> SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 162.141.167.132:5060;branch=z9hG4bK-3652850116;rport Content-Length: 0 From: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>;tag=30356166623738343133633401393430393130303135 Accept: application/sdp User-Agent: friendly-scanner To: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>

Payload bytes withheld: they contain the sensor's address.

Unrecognised

8 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5353/udp

n.[(·rtPQ·),Q·BUt^·k·4K{Hd eo·Spn{·`oU2wT[#&se{gD·RZL·V·_zqsMaaIfB8;t/·OR6C81*|I}V·,)·# ·M2

payload bytes
00000000  6e 2e 5b 28 15 72 74 50  51 07 7f 29 2c 51 18 42  |n.[(.rtPQ..),Q.B|
00000010  55 74 5e 1c 6b 16 34 4b  7b 48 64 09 65 6f 13 53  |Ut^.k.4K{Hd.eo.S|
00000020  70 6e 7b 05 60 6f 55 32  77 54 5b 23 26 73 65 7b  |pn{.`oU2wT[#&se{|
00000030  67 44 17 52 5a 4c 1d 56  14 02 5f 7a 71 73 4d 61  |gD.RZL.V.._zqsMa|
00000040  61 49 66 42 38 3b 74 2f  10 4f 52 36 43 38 31 2a  |aIfB8;t/.OR6C81*|
00000050  7c 49 7d 56 15 1a 2c 29  1c 0c 23 0d 7f 4d 32     ||I}V..,)..#..M2|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10
SSDP1900/udp1130.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
162.35.175.206AS19318 Interserver, IncUSUnrecognised82026-10-11 06:24
162.141.167.132AS19318 Interserver, IncUSSIP22026-10-09 02:38
162.35.161.69AS19318 Interserver, IncUSUnrecognised12026-10-09 12:09
162.141.167.65AS19318 Interserver, IncUSSIP12026-10-08 03:17

Latest datagrams