UDP traffic
Datagrams matching asn:16509 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
14
Datagrams
2
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
14 datagrams from 2 sourcesRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp
payload bytes
00000000 ea 3c 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.<...........ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 06 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.server.....|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 53/udp | 14 | 2 | 28 to 54 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
- 53/udp DNS14
DNS questions
DNS record types
Networks
- AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. from 2 sources14
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18.188.181.94 | AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. | US | DNS | 10 | 2026-10-10 12:34 |
| 13.59.254.158 | AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. | US | DNS | 4 | 2026-10-10 14:20 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 ea 3c 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.<...........ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 06 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.server.....|
payload bytes
00000000 b7 80 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 67 6f 6f |.............goo| 00000010 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |gle.com.....|
payload bytes
00000000 22 c0 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 69 64 06 |"............id.| 00000010 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |server.....|
payload bytes
00000000 d2 59 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.Y...........ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.bind.....|
payload bytes
00000000 2f 06 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 67 6f 6f |/............goo| 00000010 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |gle.com.....|
payload bytes
00000000 18 41 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 69 64 06 |.A...........id.| 00000010 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |server.....|
payload bytes
00000000 ca 04 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 68 6f 73 |.............hos| 00000010 74 6e 61 6d 65 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |tname.bind.....|
payload bytes
00000000 f2 e6 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.............ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.bind.....|
payload bytes
00000000 17 83 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.............ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 06 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.server.....|
payload bytes
00000000 99 95 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 67 6f 6f |.............goo| 00000010 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 |gle.com.....|
payload bytes
00000000 a2 f2 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 69 64 06 |.............id.| 00000010 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |server.....|
payload bytes
00000000 2f 42 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 68 6f 73 |/B...........hos| 00000010 74 6e 61 6d 65 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |tname.bind.....|
payload bytes
00000000 12 7b 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.{...........ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 06 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.server.....|payload bytes
00000000 7f 8e 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 76 65 72 |.............ver| 00000010 73 69 6f 6e 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |sion.bind.....|