HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:15964 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

41

Datagrams

3

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

10

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest Redis datagram, to 8081/udp

*.·E=·%lo·-·gp~·.·fV?*h!l;·2A,4\qro·^^2·d·{b·*z·9*hZ·#b$:·egIAX;0o·!$r; TUJNTJ·~2b·

payload bytes
00000000  2a 2e 15 02 1b 45 3d 13  25 6c 6f 1c 2d 06 67 70  |*....E=.%lo.-.gp|
00000010  7e 7f 2e 17 66 56 3f 2a  68 21 6c 3b 08 0e 17 32  |~...fV?*h!l;...2|
00000020  41 2c 34 5c 71 72 6f 16  5e 5e 32 0b 64 1a 7b 62  |A,4\qro.^^2.d.{b|
00000030  19 2a 7a 7f 00 39 2a 68  5a 16 23 62 24 3a 14 65  |.*z..9*hZ.#b$:.e|
00000040  67 49 41 58 3b 30 6f 19  0e 21 24 72 3b 20 54 55  |gIAX;0o..!$r; TU|
00000050  4a 4e 54 4a 07 7e 32 62  13 9f                    |JNTJ.~2b..|

Unrecognised

12 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8081/udp

o.d[d·g33/H·P ~/VPU 4·x·N·&d/xSL\.0vM·)·Gr ·{·GQW·_·#W·rfDV·<*b·X·&*9'q+0·&7Ox·kW·.9·~W*:·

payload bytes
00000000  6f 2e 64 5b 64 1a 1f 67  33 33 2f 48 08 50 09 7e  |o.d[d..g33/H.P.~|
00000010  2f 56 50 55 0d 34 07 78  12 4e 0f 26 64 2f 78 53  |/VPU.4.x.N.&d/xS|
00000020  4c 5c 2e 30 76 4d 17 29  01 47 72 09 17 7b 07 47  |L\.0vM.).Gr..{.G|
00000030  51 57 1c 5f 0c 23 57 1e  72 66 44 56 16 3c 2a 62  |QW._.#W.rfDV.<*b|
00000040  19 58 12 0f 26 2a 39 27  71 2b 30 08 26 37 4f 78  |.X..&*9'q+0.&7Ox|
00000050  0f 6b 57 1b 0f 2e 39 01  14 7e 57 2a 3a 07 12     |.kW...9..~W*:..|

Peer-to-peer

28 datagrams from 3 sources

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp212 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
154.72.161.186AS15964 CAMTELCMBitTorrent262026-10-11 14:11
195.24.207.184AS15964 CAMTELCMUnrecognised142026-10-12 04:17
154.72.161.206AS15964 CAMTELCMBitTorrent12026-10-10 21:03

Latest datagrams