HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:135377 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

15

Datagrams

11

Source addresses

1

Networks

4

Countries

14

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

2 datagrams from 2 sources

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest CoAP datagram, to 5683/udp

@·λ.well-known·core

payload bytes
00000000  40 01 01 ce bb 2e 77 65  6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e  |@.....well-known|
00000010  04 63 6f 72 65                                    |.core|

Other services

3 datagrams from 3 sources

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest DTLS datagram, to 3391/udp

·6·*·*·|w@·"·ʬ d/·"d·0·/·

payload bytes
00000000  16 fe ff 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 36 01 00 00  |............6...|
00000010  2a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  2a fe fd 00 00 00 00 7c  |*.......*......||
00000020  77 40 1e 8a c8 22 a0 a0  18 ff 93 08 ca ac 0a 64  |w@...".........d|
00000030  2f c9 22 64 bc 08 a8 16  89 19 30 00 00 00 02 00  |/."d......0.....|
00000040  2f 01 00                                          |/..|

Unrecognised

9 datagrams from 6 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 32800/udp

r·|·

payload bytes
00000000  72 fe 1d 13 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 02 00 01 86 a0  |r...............|
00000010  00 01 97 7c 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...|............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                           |........|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2162/udp116.3
Memcached11211/udp1110,000 to 51,000

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
150.107.36.236AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKUnrecognised42026-10-11 05:08
45.194.70.251AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITSCUnrecognised22026-10-11 04:26
45.194.70.248AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITSCUnrecognised12026-10-11 04:22
165.154.41.232AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKBitTorrent12026-10-10 15:53
150.107.38.251AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKUnrecognised12026-10-10 14:37
165.154.43.179AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKCoAP12026-10-11 04:59
165.154.41.182AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKRTP12026-10-10 13:51
118.193.44.169AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKRADIUS12026-10-10 09:53
101.36.97.205AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITGBUnrecognised12026-10-10 18:54
152.32.188.207AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITHKDTLS12026-10-10 13:55
152.32.141.40AS135377 UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HK) LIMITNGUnrecognised12026-10-10 18:55

Latest datagrams