HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:132203 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

4 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A probe.cacheperiscope.me

payload bytes
00000000  df 66 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 05 70 72 6f  |.f...........pro|
00000010  62 65 0e 63 61 63 68 65  70 65 72 69 73 63 6f 70  |be.cacheperiscop|
00000020  65 02 6d 65 00 00 01 00  01                       |e.me.....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp4128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
43.134.56.104AS132203 Tencent Building, Kejizhongyi AvenueSGDNS42026-10-10 14:44

Latest datagrams