HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching asn:12389 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

7

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

2

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

7 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest SNMP datagram, to 161/udp

0'·public·0·0 · +·

payload bytes
00000000  30 27 02 01 00 04 06 70  75 62 6c 69 63 a0 1a 02  |0'.....public...|
00000010  01 06 02 01 00 02 01 00  30 0f 30 0d 06 09 2b 06  |........0.0...+.|
00000020  01 02 01 11 01 02 00 05  00                       |.........|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
SNMPv2161/udp416.3
NetBIOS137/udp313.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
178.44.106.19AS12389 RostelecomRUSNMP72026-10-09 05:39

Latest datagrams